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1. About the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) 
 
The Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle 
University, is a research centre internationally renowned for its academic excellence 
and policy relevance in local, regional and urban development, governance and policy. 
Founded in 1977, further details of our work are available at: www.ncl.ac.uk/curds 
 
 
2. The research and evidence base 
 
This submission draws upon research undertaken as part of the EPSRC and ESRC-
funded iBUILD research centre examining new funding, financing and business 
models for local infrastructure, the ESRC-funded City Evolutions project examining 
the economic evolution and adaptation of UK cities and the role of institutions and 
policy and the ESRC, BIS, CLG and WAG-funded Spatial Economics Research 
Centre work on decentralisation, institutions and economic development.2 We are 
happy to engage further with the Committee as the inquiry progresses. 
 
 
3. Context 
 
We welcome the HCLG Committee’s inquiry into this important issue of devolution in 
England. The UK and especially England remains amongst the most highly centralised 
compared to major countries internationally (Table 1, Appendix). The UK had a stable 
level of decentralisation between 1950 and 1986, underwent further centralisation until 
the late 1990s devolution, and then settled at a relatively higher level (Figure 1). In 
addition, the UK and England have longstanding and persistent geographical 
disparities in economic and social conditions that are high and increasing when 
compared internationally. The gini index of inequality of GDP per capita was above 
the OECD average and reduced slightly over 2000-2013 (Figure 2).  
 
 
1 The Bartlett School, UCL. 
2 Pike, A., O’Brien, P., Strickland, T., Thrower, G. and Tomaney, J. (2019) Financialising City 
Statecraft and Infrastructure, Elgar: Cheltenham. iBUILD research centre: 
https://research.ncl.ac.uk/ibuild/. City evolutions project: http://www.cityevolutions.org.uk/. Spatial 
Economics Research Centre: http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/. 
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While the causal relationship between centralised governance and spatial disparities 
is not clear and direct, it has been a consistent association in UK political-economic 
and geographical history.3 The need to find appropriate forms of decentralised 
governance for England has been a recurrent concern.4  
 
 
4. Definitions, rationales, benefits and costs of decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation is defined as the allocation of powers and resources from national to 
sub-national levels of government. There are different kinds of decentralisation, 
distinguished by their powers and resources, that range from the highest level of 
devolution to the lowest level administrative (Table 2). What is called ‘devolution’ in 
the discussions about decentralised governance in England is more accurately termed 
delegation because of the limited nature of the powers and resources involved. The 
main rationales for decentralised governance are better matching of public 
expenditure and services to local preferences, mobilisation of local knowledge on 
economic potential and costs, and increased accountability of local governments to 
citizens. Depending upon its form and combination of powers and resources, 
decentralisation can generate numerous benefits and costs (Table 3). 
 
 
5. Decentralised governance and economic, social and public policy outcomes 
 
Establishing whether or not decentralised governance enables better decision-making 
and generates benefits for economic and social outcomes and public policy objectives 
is not straightforward. This is because of numerous problems: the development of 
appropriate proxies relevant to particular national contexts; assembling available data 
of appropriate quality, historical coverage and international comparability; 
disentangling and isolating the effects of decentralisation; and, attributing causation 
amongst decentralisation’s multiple relationships with broader economic and 
institutional change.5 
 
Our review of the international evidence commissioned by the UK Department for 
Communities and Local Government in 2010-116, identified different types of 
decentralisation at various spatial scales, involving a range of powers and resources. 
The conclusion was that the context and conditions of the design, rationale and 
implementation of decentralisation strongly shape its effects. The impacts of 
decentralisation on issues such as the efficiency and accessibility of local services and 
on local growth are ambiguous and inconclusive. The international review suggests it 
 
3 McCann, P. (2016) The Regional-National Economic Problem: Geography, Globalisation and 
Governance, Routledge: London.| 
4 Marlow, D. (2014) English Devolution and Intermediate Tiers of Governance, LGiU Briefing, 
December, LGiU: London. 
5 Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G. and Tselios, V. (2012) “In search of the 
‘economic dividend’ of devolution: spatial disparities, spatial economic policy, and decentralisation in 
the UK”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30, 1, 10-28. 
6 Tomaney, J. Pike, A. Torrisi, G. Tselios, V. Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2011) Decentralisation Outcomes: 
A Review of Evidence and Analysis of International Data, Report by Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development (CURDS), Newcastle University, and Department of Geography and Environment, 
London School of Economics, for Department for Communities and Local Government: Newcastle 
upon Tyne. http://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/curds/files/2013/02/DecentralisationReport.pdf 
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is hard to draw any general conclusions about whether different kinds of 
decentralisation will improve or impair government quality and economic efficiency. 
This is because the multiple effects of decentralisation move in different directions 
across different dimensions and are shaped by numerous conditions. This makes 
evaluating the impacts of decentralisation difficult systematically to isolate and assess. 
Crucially, the extent, nature and kind of decentralisation is what matters to its potential 
effectiveness, outputs, outcomes and impact. Context, design, rationale and 
implementation of decentralisation strongly shape its effects at different spatial levels. 
 
Focusing on the UK and whether devolution had yielded an ‘economic dividend’ to 
improve the economies of areas receiving greater powers and resources, our research 
found: i) a varied and uneven nature of the relationships between regional disparities, 
spatial economic policy and decentralisation that change direction during specific time 
periods; ii) the role of national economic growth is pivotal in explaining spatial 
disparities and the nature and extent of their relationship with the particular forms of 
spatial economic policy and decentralisation deployed; and, iii) there is limited 
evidence that any ‘economic dividend’ of devolution has emerged but this remains 
difficult to discern because it’s likely effects are over-ridden by the role of national 
economic growth in decisively shaping the pattern of spatial disparities and in 
determining the scope and effects of spatial economic policy and decentralisation.7 
 
6. The path of decentralised governance in England 
 
As England is the largest area of the UK in terms of population and economy, finding 
an appropriate intermediate level of governance between the national and the local 
has been a difficult and recurrent issue.8 In the post-war period, episodes of 
decentralisation are evident that resemble a pendulum swinging between different 
geographical scales and institutional arrangements (Figure 3).  
 
Since 2010, there has been an ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal episode of 
decentralisation. Multiple rationales have been stated, pulling decentralisation in 
different directions and muddling its precise objectives. These rationales comprise 
local growth, public service reform and expenditure reductions, democratic renewal, 
and societal challenges such as ageing and climate change. 
 
This episode is also characterised by deals and deal-making as negotiated central-
local government agreements on decentralised powers, responsibilities and 
resources. Differentiated combinations of powers and resources have been allocated 
to different areas (Figure 4). 
 
This recent decentralisation episode has created a complex map and patchwork of 
different governance arrangements across England. While other countries such as 
France, Italy and Spain have what are termed ‘asymmetrical’ or geographically uneven 
decentralised governance systems with different powers and resources allocated to 
 
7 Pike, A., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Tomaney, J., Torrisi, G. and Tselios, V. (2012) “In search of the 
‘economic dividend’ of devolution: spatial disparities, spatial economic policy, and decentralisation in 
the UK”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30, 1, 10-28. 
8 Marlow, D. (2014) English Devolution and Intermediate Tiers of Governance, LGiU Briefing, 
December, LGiU: London. 
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different areas, the degree of asymmetry in England is acute. Asymmetrical forms of 
decentralisation have potential benefits and costs (Table ).  
 
 
7. The impacts of recent decentralisation in England 
 
Given the difficulties in assessing the impacts of decentralised governance on 
decision-making and economic, social and public policy outcomes (see section 5. 
above), evaluating the current patchwork in England is especially challenging. This 
situation is reflected in Whitehall’s difficulties and limited capacity effectively to 
develop frameworks to monitor and evaluate the different deals and geographies. 
Indeed, evaluation has been outsourced and is the subject of current evaluations 
commissioned from external consultants by BEIS and HCLG. 
 
In assessing the impacts of decentralisation in England, it is important to establish the 
importance of rigorous and systematic policy evaluation and recognition of its limits. 
This involves setting out the logic model for decentralisation policy and its objectives 
stating its context, rationale(s) and objectives, theory of change, inputs, activities, 
outputs, outcomes and impacts. The evaluation framework can then clearly identify 
the component elements and their relations, recognising the range between those that 
are shorter term with fewer influences are easier to measure and clearly attribute 
compared to those that are longer term with many influences making them more 
difficult and harder to attribute (Figure 5). 
 
It is challenging, then, clearly and directly to attribute changes in economic output or 
employment to changes in governance arrangements. Efforts are being made 
including SQW’s evaluation of investment funds in the devolution deals and the 
attempts by specific deal areas to demonstrate their effects including the Glasgow 
Economic Commission work on the Clyde Valley City Region Deal. 
 
Appropriate data availability is important. However, this issue is further complicated 
by the different geographies of the deal areas. For example, the North of Tyne area 
lacks alignment with other relevant geographies in north east England including the 
LEP and Passenger Transport Executive. 
 
Drawing upon our EPRC and ESRC-funded research projects, we offer the following 
points regarding the assessment of decentralisation in England in the sub-sections 
below. 
 
 
7.1 Deals and deal-making 
 
As a governance and public policy innovation in the English context, deals and deal-
making have generated benefits and costs. The benefits include: 
 
• providing a channel for local actors to talk to the centre 
• empowering local actors 
• encouraging strategic thinking 
• promoting innovation 
• stimulating governance reform 
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The costs include: 
 
• uneven information and power between central and local actors 
• the ambiguous role of the centre as supporter, appraiser and authoriser of the 
plans of local actors 
• limited capacity nationally and centrally in the context of expenditure reductions 
• Limited transparency, scrutiny and accountability. 
• Uneven allocations of financial resources, for example Investment Funds 
(Table 5)  
• labour-intensive and time-consuming for local partners and central government 
departments 
• lack of alignment of administrative geographies, for example between deal and 
LEP and other areas 
• slippage and prolonged timescales from announcement to implementation. 
 
The deal-based approach has been central in the ad hoc, piecemeal creation of the 
patchwork of decentralised governance arrangements across England. A positive 
reading interprets this picture as appropriately reflecting the geographical differences 
in ambition, aspiration and capacity for decentralised governance and the ‘bespoke’ 
outcomes of national-local deal-making tailored to particular circumstances. 
 
A more critical reading sees an overly complicated system in which co-ordination, 
integration and alignment amongst the actors and institutions involved is difficult, time-
consuming and costly. Negative externalities or spill-overs spread to adjoining areas 
with different packages or no decentralised powers and resources. These effects 
further complicate co-operation and joint working for example on strategic and longer-
term cross-boundary issues including health and infrastructure. Little sense of fairness 
or equity exists in the powers and resources allocated across the country. This 
situation potentially fuels further discontent, unease and political fragmentation and 
dissent with how the current governance arrangements are working for people and 
places. 
 
 
7.2 Funding and financing decentralisation 
The decentralisation of fiscal powers over taxing and spending is a central element of 
higher levels of decentralised governance. Such arrangements define the instruments 
available to decentralised governance institutions for local revenue generation and 
expenditure. Within the current highly centralised governance and funding system in 
England, reforms since 2010 have introduced incremental changes providing some 
limited kinds of fiscal decentralisation including business rate retention and various 
precepts and supplements. On some calculations, the share of local government 
spending raised locally increased from 25.2% to 40.4% between 2010/11 and 
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2016/17.9 However, the new system of fiscal decentralisation in England is marked by 
two key characteristics10:  
• The reduction and replacement of central transfers that offered a degree of 
certainty and stability with a fragmented stream of local revenue raising 
instruments has reinforced dependencies, introduced greater uncertainty and 
instability into the system and heightened the spatial disparities between large 
and strong and small and weak local tax base areas.  
• More imaginative thinking and innovation is needed to formulate a more 
strategic and longer-term financial plan for local government in England 
capable of reforming a highly centralised system in fair and effective ways 
simultaneously to provide greater fiscal decentralisation and retain 
redistribution between areas with smaller and weaker local tax bases and larger 
and higher economic and social needs. 
7.3 Local and regional identities 
 
Drawing lines on maps to limit jurisdictions is relatively straight-forward, but creating 
meaningful local and regional boundaries is more difficult. Since 2010 in England, the 
approach has been to prioritise ‘functional' economic areas’ – for example reflecting 
‘travel to work areas’. However, effective regional governance requires the support of 
citizens. Questions of local and regional identity matter because boundaries also need 
to pay attention to a shared sense of place and patterns of belonging and 
attachment.11 Successful democratic polities operate across territories that are 
understood to have real meaning to citizens and voters. Where this is not the case, it 
can be a recipe for indifference or dysfunction. Centrally determined boundaries, 
which make sense in Whitehall, can produce regions that have little popular affiliation. 
Such regions may dispense large amounts of tax-payers money in ways which appear 
opaque and unaccountable. Equally, the deal-making approach to decentralisation 
can produce regions that are neither functional nor popular in ways that can set back 
to aim of democratic decentralisation.  
 
 
7.4 Directly-elected metro-mayors 
 
Directly Elected Metro-mayors (DEMMs) have been introduced in some places in 
England. The case for DEMMs rests on claims that they: facilitate economic growth; 
provide authoritative, visible leadership; cut through policy problems; enhance local 
democratic engagement and accountability; and, work better at the metropolitan 
scale.12 
 
9 McNulty, C. (2019) “What does the 2019 Spending Review mean for councils?”, Room 151, 6 
March, https://www.room151.co.uk/funding/what-does-the-2019-spending-review-mean-for-councils/ 
10 CURDS evidence to CLG Committee Local Government Finance and Fair Funding Review 2019, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/housing-
communities-and-local-government-committee/local-government-finance-and-the-2019-spending-
review/written/98476.pdf 
11 Tomaney, J. (2018) “A mess of pottage? The North of Tyne deal and the travails of devolution”, 
LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, 4 January, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-north-of-
tyne-deal-and-the-travails-of-devolution/ 
12 Tomaney, J., O’Brien, P., Pike, A. and Jenkins, M. (2018) Five Theses on Directly-elected Metro-
Mayors, Unpublished Paper, CURDS: Newcastle University. 
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Despite a body of normative literature that lauds the role of mayors13, the evidence on 
the impacts of DEMMs is sparse. There are very few international examples of mayors 
being directly-elected at the scale of the metropolitan city-region. Although directly 
elected mayors at the municipal scale are common around the world, there is great 
variation in their powers, responsibilities, resources, geographical remits and impacts. 
14 There is no single ‘ideal type’ mayor against which the metro-mayoralties in England 
can be assessed. 
 
Following the election of the first wave of DEMMs in 2017, evaluation of their effects 
needs to address the differences they have made in their areas to increasing 
productivity and economic growth, reducing social and spatial inequalities, providing 
political leadership and resolving policy problems, improving democratic engagement, 
and demonstrating the value of working at the metropolitan scale.    
 
 
7.5 North of Tyne metro-mayor and Combined Authority 
 
The new decentralised governance arrangements introduced in the North of Tyne area 
are a microcosm of the wider issues and problems in England.15 The North of Tyne 
faces a set of deep social and economic challenges that it shares with the rest of the 
North East region. However, the metro-mayor and North of Tyne Combined Authority 
have only limited powers and resources to tackle the critical issues facing the region. 
This situation is made more challenging by the geography of the North of Tyne area 
which was created by a political and administrative fix between national and local 
government. The area is too small and not a meaningful economic geography for 
public policy-making and has weak identification amongst the wider public. The North 
of Tyne will have only a ‘mini-metro-mayor’ with less powers, fewer resources and a 
weaker political voice compared to the other six metro-mayors and Combined 
Authorities in England. 
It can be argued that even limited decentralisation of powers and resources is 
welcome because it can be built upon and represents the beginnings of a challenge 
to the highly-centralised governance system in England. In this vein, the metro-mayor 
and North of Tyne Combined Authority can attempt to make a difference by identifying 
signal issues around which business, public and civic actors can mobilise and 
progress (e.g. reducing inequality, improving wellbeing, tackling poor health, Living 
Wage agreements) and effectively using its new institutions (Inclusive Growth Board, 
Housing and Land Board, Mayoral Development Corporations) and initiatives 
(Education Improvement Challenge). More likely though is that a metro-mayor with 
weak powers and limited resources governing a small area that lacks a meaningful 
economic geography and is characterised by low public awareness, fails to make an 
 
13 Barber, B. (2011) If Mayors Ruled the World, Yale University Press: Newhaven, CT  
14 Schragger, R. (2006) “Can strong mayors empower weak cities?”, The Yale Law Journal, 115, 9, 
2542-2578; Wollmann, H. (2014) “The directly-elected mayor in the German Länder – introduction, 
implementation and impact”, Public Money and Management, 34, 5, 331-337. 
15 Pike, A., Tomaney, J. and Jenkins, M. (2019) The North of Tyne Metro-Mayor: An Office Without 
Power?, CURDS: Newcastle University, 
https://www.ncl.ac.uk/media/wwwnclacuk/curds/files/North%20of%20Tyne%20Metro-Mayor%20-
%20An%20Office%20Without%20Power.pdf 
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impact upon the large-scale and persistent problems facing the North East. As the 
new political leader and institution struggle to make an appreciable difference, the 
danger is that the case for more meaningful devolution of powers and resources is 
undermined. In the longer-term, what is needed is a focus on a more meaningful 
geography encompassing the whole North East region, a meaningful decentralisation 
of substantive powers and resources and fresh thinking about how to tackle the 
region’s long-standing economic, social and environmental problems.  
 
8. Further and future decentralisation in England 
 
Given the ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal nature of the recent episode of 
decentralisation in England and the difficulties in assessing its impacts, a more 
comprehensive and thoughtful approach is needed to thinking through and 
implementing further decentralisation in existing and new areas yet to be allocated 
powers and resources if the potential benefits are to be maximised and the costs and 
risks reduced. 
 
Our recent work called for the clarification of the rationales and principles of 
decentralisation with a ‘road map’ and process to provide some clarity to the vision, 
direction, purpose, principles and strategy for the decentralised governance of 
England in the round.16  
 
The current ad hoc, incremental and piecemeal governance needs to move towards a 
more planned, transformative and comprehensive approach. It will, however, need to 
work with the patchwork of the different geographical scales and institutions of 
governance that have been introduced in England since 2010. 
 
This is not a call for a top-down blueprint designed and delivered from Whitehall in 
London. It is a call for an open, transparent and systematic approach. Such a road 
map would provide greater fairness and equity in setting out what kinds of powers and 
resources are on offer for places. For those areas at the earliest stages of thinking 
through what decentralisation might mean for them, it could provide a normative sense 
of the kinds of powers and resources that specific types of areas should be seeking. 
Such a clear road map would remove the existing opaqueness and lack of 
accountability of deals designed, formulated and made between political leaders and 
senior officials at the local and national levels. Otherwise, the problems and costs of 
co-ordination, integration and alignment between governance actors and institutions 
will be reproduced and, potentially, multiply as further pieces are added to the existing 
patchwork.  
 
With the change in government in July 2019 and the dominance of Brexit in national 
political economy, it is difficult to assess the new administration’s commitment to 
decentralisation in England. Decentralisation had slowed under the last government 
following the EU referendum in 2016 and general election in 2017, afflicted by ‘Brexit 
blight’ and lack of political and administrative capacity in Parliament and Whitehall. In 
principle the UK government’s ‘Devolution Framework’ may provide some of the 
 
16 Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) Decentralisation: Issues, 
Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle University. 
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elements of this decentralisation ‘road map’. However, its publication has been 
delayed until “after Brexit” and details of its aims and content are as yet unknown.17 
 
In July 2019, the new Prime Minister announced support to “level up the powers 
offered to mayors” to enable “more people” to “benefit from the kind of local 
government structures” in London and Greater Manchester and to provide 
“communities a greater say over changes to transport, housing, public services and 
infrastructure that will benefit their areas and drive local growth”.18 He restated an 
ambition for “levelling up across every nation and region across the UK, providing 
support to towns and cities and closing the opportunity gap in our society”19 and made 
announcements on a Towns Fund, the Northern Powerhouse and public expenditure 
on transport infrastructure in northern England and further ‘Growth Deals’ in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.20  
 
Wherever decentralisation goes next, its kind, nature and resources are critical. There 
is a need for the meaningful decentralisation of powers and resources to enable places 
to tailor place-based institutions, policies and public services to address their particular 
combinations of aspirations and needs.  
 
There is evidence that the current episode of decentralisation in England and its 
hallmark deals and deal-making approach are reaching their zenith. First, areas that 
secured deals in earlier waves are increasingly seeking further deals in a bid to acquire 
additional powers and resources, reproducing the deal-based model of governance 
reform and public policy-making with all its benefits and costs.21  
 
Second, areas putting forward deal proposals are having to wait for Ministerial and 
civil servant consideration and response, demonstrating the lack of political 
prioritisation and administrative capacity at the national level, or receiving rejections 
for not meeting certain criteria. For example, the One Yorkshire proposals in 2018 was 
rejected by the former Secretary of State because they “do not meet our devolution 
criteria”.22 Yet any such criteria have not been published. 
 
Third, knitting together the strategic aims and work of the decentralised institutions 
and their differentiated powers and resources within the broader patchwork is 
 
17 Larsson, N. and Peters, D. (2019) “Further delay to devolution drive”, The Municipal Journal, 24 
April, https://www.themj.co.uk/Further-delay-to-devolution-drive/213469. 
18 Johnson, B. (2019) PM Speech at Manchester Science and Industry Museum, 27 July, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-manchester-science-and-industry-museum 
19 Johnson, B. (2019) PM statement on priorities for the government, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-priorities-for-the-government-25-july-
2019 
20 Press Release (2019) 28 July, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-launches-new-
growth-deals-funding-as-he-kicks-off-union-visits-in-scotland 
21 Greater Manchester agreed six devolution deals between 2014-17 cited in Greater Manchester 
Independent Prosperity Review (2018) Greater Manchester: The Emerging Impact of Devolution, 
November. Sharman, L. (2019) “Liverpool submits £230m ‘Green City Deal’”, Local Government, 30 
July, https://www.localgov.co.uk/Liverpool-submits-230m-Green-City-Deal/47894.  
22 James Brokenshire quoted in Elledge, J. (2018) “James Brokenshire’s rejection of the One 
Yorkshire devolution deal absolutely stinks of partisanship”, Citymetric, 12 February, 
https://www.citymetric.com/politics/james-brokenshire-s-rejection-one-yorkshire-devolution-deal-
absolutely-stinks-partisanship 
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becoming more difficult as it becomes more complex. While there is some evidence 
of co-operation and joint announcements amongst the higher profile metro-mayors23, 
evidence is limited that the overall system of governance in England is working as 
coherently and effectively as it might. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Overall, this submission is not an argument against further decentralisation, especially 
given the UK and England’s highly centralised system and longstanding social and 
spatial inequalities, nor is it a call for further caution and a slower approach or for a 
faster, radical and revolutionary ‘big bang’ strategy. Rather, the submission highlights 
the need comprehensively to think through and clarify what decentralisation is for and 
how it works in England and to set this out in a clear, open and transparent road map.  
 
This task will be especially important in the context of future disruptive change 
especially Brexit. Some advocates of decentralisation see it as the ‘golden thread’ of 
Brexit and an opportunity to reverse centralisation and ‘take back control’ of local 
affairs from a distant and unresponsive national government and political 
establishment.24 There are political risks of limiting decentralisation. The lack of 
economic opportunities and voice for so-called ‘left behind’ people and places and 
perceived unfairness has fuelled the discontent and political fragmentation and 
division in recent years across the UK.25 Lack of public engagement and interest in 
the current episode of decentralisation is already evident, for example in turnouts in 
the Durham County Council devolution deal ballot and metro-mayor and Police and 
Crime Commissioner elections. Engaging the public more effectively suggests the 
need to do decentralisation in a different way. 
 
  
 
23 Sandford, M. (2017) “Soft power and grant coalitions: the first six months of ‘metro-mayors’”, 
January, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/soft-power-and-grant-coalitions-first-six-months-metro-
mayors 
24 Pike, A. (2018) “Devolution in England needs real powers and resources if it is to ‘take back control’ 
in Brexit”, The UK in a Changing Europe Blog, 20 June,  https://ukandeu.ac.uk/devolution-in-england-
needs-real-powers-and-resources-if-it-is-to-take-back-control-in-brexit/ 
25 Tomaney, J. and Pike, A. (2018) “Brexit, devolution and economic development in ‘left-behind’ 
regions”, Welsh Economic Review, 26, 29-37, http://doi.org/10.18573/wer. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Regional Authority Index, ranked by country, 2010* 
 
Country Regional Authority Index 
Germany 37.0 
Spain 33.6 
Belgium 33.1 
United States 29.6 
Italy 27.3 
Austria 23.0 
Brazil 19.5 
Netherlands 17.5 
Japan 13.0 
Sweden 12.0 
UK 11.2 
Greece 11.0 
 
* The Regional Authority Index (RAI) is a measure of the authority of regional governments in 81 
democracies or quasi-democracies on an annual basis over the period 1950-2010. The dataset 
encompasses subnational government levels with an average population of 150,000 or more. 
Regional authority is measured along ten dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal 
autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal control, 
borrowing control, and constitutional reform. 
 
Source: Data from Arjan Schakel (2018) 
https://www.arjanschakel.nl/index.php/regional-authority-index 
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Figure 1: Regional Authority Index, UK, 1950-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from data from Arjan Schakel (2018) 
https://www.arjanschakel.nl/index.php/regional-authority-index 
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 13 
Figure 2: Gini index of inequality of GDP per capita across TL3 regions, 2000 
and 2013* 
 
 
*GBR = Great Britain 
 
Source: OECD Regional Statistics (2015) (database) in OECD (2016) Regions at 
a Glance, OECD: Paris 
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Table 2: Forms of decentralisation 
 
Level Form Characteristics 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Administrative Administrative functions and 
responsibilities undertaken at the 
sub-national levels 
Deconcentration Dispersion of central government 
functions and responsibilities to sub-
national field offices. Powers 
transferred to lower-level actors who 
are accountable to their superiors in 
a hierarchy  
Delegation Transfer of policy responsibility to 
local government or semi-
autonomous organisations that are 
not controlled by central government 
but remain accountable to it  
Political Political functions of government and 
governance undertaken at the sub-
national level  
Fiscal Autonomy over tax, spending and 
public finances ceded by central 
government to sub-national levels  
Devolution Central government allows quasi-
autonomous local units of 
government to exercise power and 
control over the transferred policy 
 
Source: Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) 
Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle 
University. 
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Table 3: Potential benefits and costs of decentralisation 
 
Potential Benefits  Potential Costs 
Devolved policies better reflect 
territorial preferences (allocative 
efficiencies) 
  
Additional administrative costs of additional 
layers of government and/or governance 
institutions 
  
Improved knowledge of territorial 
economic potential (productive 
efficiencies) 
Loss of scale economies in policy 
formulation and delivery 
  
Increased ‘rent-seeking’ by interest groups 
better able to influence sub-national 
territorial rather than national institutions 
  
Democratic accountability improves 
efficiency of policy formulation and 
implementation, fosters innovation  
  
Weaker disciplines of monitoring and 
evaluation (national finance ministries as 
tougher drivers of efficiency than territorial 
institutions) 
  
Fiscal autonomy provides hard 
budget constraints and (where 
applicable) tax-varying power allows 
marginal changes to taxation and 
spending  
Budget constraints increasingly tied to 
territorial fiscal capacity 
  
Weak incentives due to lack of mechanism 
linking public spending with tax revenues 
raised within sub-national territories  
  
Lower coordination and compliance 
costs vis-à-vis the rest of the national 
territory  
Reduced coordination with the rest of the 
national territory with possible negative 
spill-over effects both on and from sub-
national territories  
  
 
Source: Adapted from Ashcroft, B., Swales, J. K. and McGregor, P. G. (2005) Is 
Devolution Good for the Scottish Economy? A Framework for Analysis, 
Devolution Briefings No. 26, March, ESRC Devolution and Constitutional 
Change Programme: London. 
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Figure 3: Pendulum swings in decentralised governance in England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) 
Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle 
University. 
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Figure 4: Powers by Combined Authority area  
 
 
 
Source: Pike, A., Tomaney, J. and Jenkins, M. (2019) The North of Tyne Metro-
Mayor: An Office Without Power?, CURDS: Newcastle University 
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Table 4: The benefits and costs of asymmetrical decentralisation 
 
Potential benefits Potential costs 
 
Accommodate diverse preferences for 
autonomy across regions  
 
Adapting the institutional and fiscal 
frameworks to the capacities of 
subnational governments 
 
Advanced form of place-based policies 
 
Experimenting 
 
Sequencing decentralisation 
 
Providing the enabling institutional 
environment to design territorial 
development strategies more targeted 
to local needs 
 
Tailoring solutions for special 
challenges 
 
 
Lack of accountability and transparency 
 
Complexity and coordination costs 
 
Lack of clarity for citizens 
 
Potential risks of increased disparities 
(in capacities) 
 
Secession and autonomy 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2019) Asymmetric Decentralisation: Policy 
Implications in Colombia, OECD: Paris. 
 
 
 
  
 19 
Figure 5: Measuring the decentralisation difference: from inputs to impact 
 
 
 
Source: Pike, A., Kempton, L., Marlow, D., O’Brien, P. and Tomaney, J. (2016) 
Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, CURDS: Newcastle 
University, adapted from Neil MacCallum, Office of Project Advice and 
Training, London, UK; OECD LEED Evaluation Workshop, Trento, 2006. 
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Table 5: Investment fund per capita (£) by Combined Authority area, 2019 
Combined Authority Investment fund per capita (£ annually) 
West of England 32.86 
North of Tyne 24.41 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough 23.61 
Tees Valley 22.30 
Sheffield 21.53 
Liverpool 19.42 
West Midlands 12.60 
Greater Manchester 10.72 
 
Source: Pike, A., Tomaney, J. and Jenkins, M. (2019) The North of Tyne Metro-
Mayor: An Office Without Power?, CURDS: Newcastle University 
  
